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Abstract 
In three experiments, we investigated contextual control of attention in human 
discrimination learning. In each experiment, participants initially received discrimination 
training in which cues from Dimension A were relevant in Context 1, but irrelevant in 
Context 2, while cues from Dimension B were irrelevant in Context 1, but relevant in Context 
2. In Experiment 1, the same cues from each dimension were used in Contexts 1 and 2, while 
in Experiments 2 and 3, the cues from each dimension were changed across contexts. In each 
experiment, participants were subsequently shifted to a transfer discrimination involving 
novel cues from either dimension in order to assess contextual control of attention. In 
Experiment 1, measures of eye-gaze during the transfer discrimination revealed that 
Dimension A received more attention than Dimension B in Context 1, while the reverse 
occurred in Context 2. Corresponding results indicating contextual control of attention were 
found in Experiments 2 and 3, which used the speed of learning (associability) as an indirect 
marker of learned attentional changes. Implications of our results for current theories of 
learning and attention are discussed.          
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Prior experience changes the ease with which we learn about a stimulus. Such changes 
in associability are demonstrated, for instance, by the intra-dimensional/extra-dimensional 
shift (ID/ED shift) effect (for a survey, see Le Pelley, 2004; Le Pelley, Mitchell, Beesley, 
George, & Wills, 2016; Pearce & Mackintosh, 2010). In one demonstration of the effect, 
Uengoer and Lachnit (2012) trained human participants to categorize stimuli varying on two 
dimensions (e.g., color and shape). For the solution of the discrimination problem, two values 
from one dimension were relevant as they consistently signaled the category of the stimuli, 
while two values from another dimension were irrelevant by being unrelated to category 
membership (e.g., red squares and red circles belonged to one category, while blue squares 
and blue circles belonged to another category). Subsequently, participants received a second 
discrimination in which the stimuli were characterized by novel values from the previous 
dimensions (e.g., green, yellow; triangle, diamond). Uengoer and Lachnit observed that the 
second discrimination was acquired more rapidly when based on values from the dimension 
that had previously been trained as relevant for the first discrimination (ID shift; e.g., colors 
green and yellow signaled category membership) than when based on the previously 
irrelevant dimension (ED shift; e.g., shapes triangle and diamond signaled category 
membership). This effect suggests that training of the initial discrimination resulted in more 
attention being paid to stimulus features belonging to the relevant than the irrelevant 
dimension, and that these changes in attention were transferred to the stimuli of the second 
discrimination, which facilitated acquisition of the ID shift discrimination compared to the ED 
shift condition (e.g., Mackintosh, 1975). The assumption that discrimination learning involves 
changes in attention to relevant and irrelevant stimuli is further supported by studies using 
measures of eye-gaze (e.g., Le Pelley, Beesley, & Griffiths, 2011; Lucke, Lachnit, Koenig, & 
Uengoer, 2013; Mitchell, Griffiths, Seetoo, & Lovibond, 2012) and neurophysiological 
markers (e.g., Feldmann-Wüstefeld, Uengoer, & Schubö, 2015).   
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Uengoer, Lachnit, Lotz, Koenig, and Pearce (2013) and George and Kruschke (2012) 
demonstrated that changes in associability can come under the control of contextual stimuli. 
In their experiments, participants were initially trained with a conditional discrimination 
involving two contexts. In Context 1, the discrimination was solvable on the basis of cues 
from Dimension A, while cues from Dimension B were irrelevant. In Context 2, the same set 
of cues comprised a discrimination for which Dimension B was relevant and Dimension A 
was irrelevant. Following this training, participants received a second discrimination in which 
novel cues from Dimension A were relevant, and novel cues from Dimension B were 
irrelevant. Participants were found to master the second discrimination more rapidly when 
training was given in Context 1 than when trained in Context 2. This finding indicates that the 
associability of (and, by inference, attention to) the stimuli varied according to the context in 
which they were presented. More precisely, it suggests that in Context 1, cues from 
Dimension A possessed greater associability than those from Dimension B, while in Context 
2, the opposite applied - greater associability of Dimension B than of Dimension A. 
In real life, humans and other animals deal with a vast variety of tasks, and stimuli that 
are relevant to accomplish a certain task may be unimportant for successful performance in 
another situation. For instance, when looking for a friend in a crowd of people, it may be 
advantageous to attend to clothing color, while, when searching for a book in a crowded 
library, clothing color provides no useful information. In view of this, the ability of context-
specific attention (George & Kruschke, 2012; Uengoer et al., 2013) appears to be an obvious 
way in which organisms may deal with the ever-changing demands in their environments. 
However, many theories of learning and attention neglected the context as a modulator for 
stimulus processing (e.g., Kruschke, 1992; Le Pelley, 2004; Mackintosh, 1975; Pearce, 
George, & Redhead, 1998; Pearce & Mackintosh, 2010). Thus, these models are unable to 
capture the possibility that a stimulus receives considerable attention in one context, while 
being ignored in a different context.                          
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The aim of the present study was twofold. One aim was to assess the validity of the 
conclusion in terms of context-specific attention drawn from the studies by Uengoer et al. 
(2013) and George and Kruschke (2012). In these two previous studies, contextual control of 
attention during initial training was inferred from subsequent differences in learning rates. If 
this inference is valid, then it should be possible to arrive at the same conclusion using other 
indicators of attention. Therefore, Experiment 1 was based on the procedures used by 
Uengoer et al. (2013) and George and Kruschke (2012), but in addition, included measures of 
eye-gaze as a marker of attention. By means of this measure, we investigated whether training 
a stimulus as relevant in one context, but as irrelevant in another context, results in 
corresponding changes in overt attention, and we explored whether changes in overt attention 
are transferred to novel stimuli in a context-specific manner.    
A second aim of the present study, which was pursued by Experiments 2 and 3, was to 
investigate the role of associative interference for the formation of context-specific changes in 
associability. Consider a study by Griffiths and Le Pelley (2009), which provided no evidence 
that changes in associability are modulated by contextual changes using a blocking procedure. 
In a typical blocking experiment (Kamin, 1968), an individual stimulus is repeatedly paired 
with an outcome (A+) before presented in compound with a second stimulus B. This 
compound stimulus is also repeatedly followed by the outcome (AB+). During a final test, it 
can be observed that responding to Stimulus B by itself is weaker than for a control group in 
which pre-training with Stimulus A was omitted. It is said that learning about Stimulus B was 
blocked due to prior training of Stimulus A.  
For humans and for non-human animals, it was found that subsequent learning about a 
previously blocked stimulus was retarded (Kruschke & Blair, 2000; Mackintosh & Turner, 
1971) indicating that blocking involves a reduction of attention to the blocked stimulus. On 
the basis of this finding, Griffiths and Le Pelley (2009) examined whether the rate of new 
learning about a previously blocked stimulus can be modulated by contextual manipulations. 
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During an initial phase, participants received training in which individual stimuli were paired 
with an outcome (e. g., AO1, CO1, EO1). During a second phase, each of the stimuli 
was presented in compound with a novel stimulus, and these compounds were also paired 
with the outcome (e. g., ABO1, CDO1, EFO1). Following this blocking treatment, 
participants received a third phase of training in which stimulus compounds signaled a new 
outcome. Some of these compounds comprised stimuli that had already been presented 
together during Phase 2 (old compounds, e. g., AB), whereas other compounds comprised one 
blocking stimulus and one blocked stimulus that had been trained on separate occasions 
during the preceding phase (new compounds, e. g., ED). Griffiths and Le Pelley observed that 
learning about the new outcome in Phase 3 proceeded slower for the blocked stimuli (e. g., B, 
D) than for the blocking stimuli (e. g., A, E) indicating that their blocking procedure led to a 
decrease in attention to the blocked stimuli. More crucially, they also reported that the 
impairment of learning about the blocked stimuli in Phase 3 was independent of whether the 
blocked stimuli were presented in old compounds or in new compounds. This finding is 
consistent with the view that attention to a stimulus is not controlled by the context in which it 
appears.  
In the experiment by Griffiths and Le Pelley (2009), stimuli were either trained as 
predictive (blocking stimuli) or as redundant (blocked stimuli). Thus, the significance of the 
stimuli remained unchanged throughout the blocking treatment. In contrast, Uengoer et al. 
(2013) and George and Kruschke (2012) used conditional discriminations in which the stimuli 
were explicitly trained as both relevant and irrelevant depending on the context. Uengoer et 
al. suggested that such explicit training in which the significance of a stimulus changes 
according to context may be necessary for the formation of contextual control of stimulus 
associability (for a similar suggestion, see George & Kruschke). The aim of Experiments 2 
and 3 was to test this proposal.      
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Experiment 1 
In Experiment 1, we recorded gaze position as a measure of overt attention in order to 
examine the contextual control of attention. In each learning trial (see Figure 1), participants 
were presented with a stimulus array consisting of two cue cues from two dimensions, A and 
B (letter and shape), presented above and below fixation, and two peripheral stimuli of 
different colors to the left and the right of fixation (context and control stimulus). The control 
stimulus, which was the same on every trial, served as a reference to assess eye gaze toward 
the context.  
The learning schedule of Experiment 1 is shown in Table 1. In Stage 1, participants 
received a conditional discrimination involving two contexts. In Context 1, correct responding 
(R1 or R2) was predictable on the basis of two cues from Dimension A (A1 and A2), while 
two cues from Dimension B (B1 and B2) were irrelevant. In Context 2, the same set of cues 
comprised a discrimination that was solvable on the basis of the cues from Dimension B, 
while those from Dimension A were irrelevant.  
In Stage 2, which used another set of cues from each dimension, participants were 
trained with two optional-shift discriminations. In Context 1, the compounds A3B3 and A4B4 
were related to the responses R1 and R2, respectively, and in Context 2, R1 and R2 were 
signaled by the compounds A5B5 and A6B6, respectively. Thus, in Stage 2, the 
discrimination in each context was optional in the sense that it is solvable on the basis of 
either Dimension A or Dimension B, or both.            
If training of the conditional discrimination in Stage 1 results in context-dependent 
attention that is transferred to the cues from Stage 2, then Dimension A will receive more 
overt attention than Dimension B in case of the optional-shift discrimination in Context 1 of 
Stage 2, while Dimension B will capture more overt attention than Dimension A when 
participants work on the optional-shift discrimination in Context 2 of the second stage.             
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Method 
Participants. Thirty-three students of the Philipps-Universität Marburg participated in 
the experiment and received either course credit or payment. All participants had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision. The data of three participants were excluded from further analysis 
because of signal noise or excessive blinking. The data of four participants were excluded 
because their response accuracy did not exceed 60% in at least one of the two contexts in 
Stage 1.  Of the remaining participants 21 were female and 5 were male. Their age ranged 
from 18 to 29 with a median of 21.  
Apparatus. Testing took place in a sound-attenuated, dimmed room. Monocular eye 
movements were recorded using an infrared video-based eye tracker (Eyelink 2000, SR-
Research) that sampled position of pupil and corneal reflection at 1000Hz. Sampling of the 
left versus right eye was counterbalanced across participants. The eye tracker was calibrated 
with a 9-point grid of calibration targets. The calibration procedure was rerun until subsequent 
validation confirmed an average calibration error < 0.5°.  The eye tracker restrained the 
participants head via chin and forehead rests and was table-mounted in front of a 22”-CRT 
monitor (Iiyama, Vision Master Pro514) yielding an eye-to-screen-distance of 78 cm. 
Stimulus delivery was controlled by Presentation® software (www.neurobs.com). 
Stimuli. Visual stimuli were presented on a 60% grey background. Two colored 
squares were shown 130mm to the left and to the right of fixation respectively and 
represented the context and control stimuli. Colors (R, G, B) were chosen from a set of red 
(233, 198, 175), green (198, 233, 175), and blue (170, 204, 255). A letter and a geometric 
shape were shown 130mm above and below central fixation to represent the relevant and 
irrelevant cues. Letters were randomly chosen from a set of M, R, S, X, B, G, H, and K. As 
shapes we used triangle, diamond, pentagon, star, heart, cross, rhomboid, and an L-shaped 
figure. Letters and geometric figures were shown on a rectangular white background and had 
the same size of 2 × 2cm as the colored squares. All stimuli had an eccentricity of 9.46 
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degrees of visual angle (dva), and had the same probability of occurring either above or below 
fixation (relevant and irrelevant cues), or to the left or to the right (context and control 
stimulus). 
Procedure. After participants gave written consent to the experiment, written 
instructions were presented that exemplified the events and task demands that occurred within 
a trial. Eight practice trials were run prior to the actual experiment to assure that participants 
had understood the instructions. 
------------------------------------------ 
Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------------------ 
Figure 1 depicts the sequence of events in a trial. The trial started with a fixation cross 
for 2000ms that was followed by a 4000ms presentation of cues (letter and shape) together 
with the context and control stimulus (colors). Participants were instructed to inspect the four 
stimuli and eye movements were recorded to obtain measures of overt attention. Participants 
had to learn after which combinations of cues they had to press the mouse button once (R1) 
and after which combinations a double-click (R2) was required. They were instructed to 
withhold their response until the occurrence of a black circular prompt stimulus. When the 
black circle occurred, each subsequent mouse click was registered by the occurrence of a 
white circle within the black circle. The time window to successfully register a response was 
restricted to 2000ms. After the time window of 2000ms, the black circle disappeared and a 
feedback screen was presented for 3000ms. Feedback specified the correct response (single-
/double-click) by showing one or two white circles within the black circle and again presented 
the previous set of stimuli. A blank screen was then shown for a random interval of 2000 to 
4000ms until the next trial began. 
------------------------------------------ 
Table 1 about here 




During the entire experiment the color of one box on the horizontal meridian was the 
same in all trials. The other colored box provided the context that participants had to encode 
in order to solve the discrimination. The position of the two colors (left or right of fixation) 
randomly changed across trials. The critical feature of the trained discrimination was that the 
context color determined which dimension (letter or shape) was relevant and which was 
irrelevant for predicting the correct response. 
Table 1 depicts the trial types in the current experiment. In Context 1, Cues A1 and 
A2, which belonged to Dimension A, were reliable predictors of a single and double mouse 
click respectively, while after B1 and B2, which belonged to Dimension B, both responses 
were correct with the same probability. This contingency was reversed in Context 2, where 
Dimension A was irrelevant while Dimension B was predictive of a correct response. Each 
context was in effect for a block of 16 trials with four replications of each trial type. The two 
contexts alternated over the first six blocks (three blocks each) yielding a total number of 96 
trials in the first stage. In the second stage new elements of Dimensions A and B again were 
trained in Context 1, A3B3→R1 and A4B4→R2, and in Context 2, A5B5→R1 and 
A6B6→R2. However, the discriminations now were optional because the correct prediction 
could be made by attending to either Dimension A or to Dimension B in all trials regardless of 
context.   
In both stages of training, we used different pseudo-random trial sequences for each 
participant.  Trials were randomly shuffled within blocks with the restricting that the same 
correct response and the same cue did occur a maximum number of three times in a row. The 
assignment of dimensions letters and shapes to Dimensions A and B was counterbalanced 
across participants, as was the assignment of specific letters and specific shapes to cues 1 to 6 
within these dimensions. 
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Data Analysis. Fixations were detected using a velocity-based algorithm with a 
threshold of 30°/sec. Fixation probability was computed from the frequency of fixating a 
stimulus element at least once during the 4-sec interval of cue and context presentation. 
Fixation dwell time was computed as the summed duration of all fixations on a stimulus 
element that occurred in the same interval. Repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
was used to analyze the data. For this and the subsequent experiments, the .05 level of 
significance was employed for all statistical tests, stated probability levels were based on the 
Greenhouse-Geisser (1959) adjustment of degrees of freedom where appropriate, and effect 
sizes were computed as generalized eta squared (Bakeman, 2005). For a focused test of our 
hypotheses of “more attention to relevant cues and contexts”, we used contrast analysis. In the 
case of multiple testing, p-values were adjusted according to Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) 
as stated in the results section  
     
Results and Discussion 
Predictive learning. During training, participants learned to anticipate the correct 
response in 76% of all trials in the acquisition stage (SEM = 2.724). This level of correct 
responding was significantly greater than chance level, t(25) = 9.430, p < .001. However, 
closer inspection of performance by individual participants revealed, that the percentage of 
correct responding followed a clear bimodal distribution as shown in Figure 2. 
------------------------------------------ 
Figure 2 about here 
------------------------------------------ 
 One subgroup of participants succeeded to predict the correct response in a high 
percentage of trials, while a second subgroup was considerably less accurate. From the 
empirical distribution of performance we derived a post-hoc factor group that encoded the 
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distinction between poor learners (< 75% correct, n = 13) and good learners (> 75% correct, n 
= 13). The probability of a correct response in both groups is shown in Figure 3.  
------------------------------------------ 
Figure 3 about here 
------------------------------------------ 
For the training stage (left panel), a 2 × 2 ANOVA revealed significant main effects of 
group, F(1,24) = 145.95, p < .001, η2 = .70, and context,  F(1,24) = 24.68, p < .001, η2 = .39, 
that were modulated by a Group × Context interaction,  F(1,24) = 6.70, p = .02, η2 = .15. 
While good learners performance was slightly better in Context 1 than in Context 2, t(12) = 
2.194, p = .049, the probability of correct responding clearly was above chance level in both 
contexts (both ps < .001 for difference from 0.5).  Poor learners on the other hand were 
characterized by a marked performance difference between contexts, t(12)=4.497, p < .001. 
Correct responding in Context 1 was well above chance level, t(12)=7.285, p < .001,  but 
there was no evidence that correct responding was above chance in Context 2, t(12)=1.196, p 
= .127. In the test stage good learners again performed better than poor learners, F(1,24) = 
9.02, p = .006, η2 = .25, but differences between contexts were not evident, F < 1, and 
performance was above chance level for both groups in both contexts (all ps <. 001). 
The difference in context-modulated performance between training and test for poor 
learners is readily explained by the major difference between the trained discriminations. 
While in the training stage encoding of the context stimulus was essential for correct 
responding in both contexts, the context could have been completely ignored in the test stage. 
For example, if poor learners ignored the context from the very beginning of the training stage 
they would have failed to detect the context changes and in turn would have failed to 
disengage attention from Dimension A when it became irrelevant in Context 2. Furthermore, 
performance in Context 2 would have been restored in the test stage when the correct 
prediction was possible with attention to either dimension in both contexts. Our analysis of 
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eye movements as a measure of overt attention in the following section will shed further light 
on this attentional interpretation. 
Attentional learning. The stimulus display consisting of one letter, one shape (cue 
elements), and two colored squares (context and control stimulus) was shown for 4 seconds in 
each trial and participants moved their eyes to focus on some elements at the cost of 
neglecting other elements. We analyzed fixation probability and fixation dwell time to 
examine how associative learning affected measures of overt attention. 
Figure 4 presents summed fixation dwell times on cue dimension A versus B 
dependent on the learning context (1 vs. 2). The four different panels depict attentional 
allocation for the group of good learners (top) and poor learners (bottom) during training (left) 
and test (right).  A super-ordinate ANOVA with factors group (Poor, Good), stage (Train, 
Test), context (1, 2) and dimension (A, B) revealed  significant two-way interactions Group × 
Dimension, F(1,24) = 7.065, p = .014, η2 = .011, and Dimension × Context, F(1,24) = 8.444, 
p = .031, η2 = .008, that were further modulated by the three-way  interaction  Group × 
Dimension × Context,  F(1,24) = 6.058, p = .021, η2 = .022. To further elucidate this 
interaction, we conducted a planned comparison of cell means using contrast analysis. For the 
ordering of factor levels shown on the x-axes in Figure 4 the contrast weights λ = [1, -1, -1, 1] 
coded for the joint hypothesis that (a) during training participants paid more attention to the 
dimension that was relevant in the given context, and (b) this context-dependent attention bias 
transferred to the test stage. Collapsed across both stages, the contrast was highly significant 
in the group of good learners, t(24) =  3.795, p < .001, r = .612, where dwell time on relevant 
cues exceeded dwell time on irrelevant cues. In contrast, the same comparison of cell means 
was not significant in poor learners,  t(24) =  0.314, p < .378, r = .064. For further analysis we 
tested the contrast for each combination of Group × Stage, where p-values were adjusted for 
multiple testing (Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995). For good learners the hypothesized contrast 
was significant for both, the training stage,  t(31) =  3.480, p = .002, r = .530, as well as the 
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test stage,  t(31) =  3.606, p = .002, r = .544, suggesting that good learners paid more attention 
to the previously relevant stimulus dimension even if this bias was no longer necessary for 
solving the task in Stage 2. In comparison, for poor learners, the contrast was neither 
significant during training,  t(31) =  -0.509, p = .692, r = .091, nor during test. t(31) =  1.096, 
p = .187, r = .193 (p-values adjusted for multiple testing of four contrasts). 
 
------------------------------------------ 
Figure 4 about here 
------------------------------------------ 
  
 To further explore the actual dwell times observed in the group of poor learners, we 
conducted separate ANOVAs for both experimental stages. For the training stage this analysis 
revealed a main effect of dimension, F(1,12) = 6.442, p = .026, η2 = .072, no main effect of 
context, F < 1, and no significant interaction, F(1,12) = 1.1354, p = .307, η2 = .003, indicating 
that poor learners spent more time fixating on Dimension A, regardless of contexts. The same 
analysis for the test stage, revealed no main effects of either dimension,  F(1,12) = 2.028, p = 
.179, η2 = .003, or context, F < 1, and no interaction F(1,12) = 3.412, p = .089, η2 = .012.  
In summary, the analysis of total dwell in the training stage revealed that good learners 
managed to use the context to focus on the relevant dimension, and switched their attentional 
focus when the context changed. Poor learners on the other hand acquired an attentional bias 
for Dimension A that was relevant in the first block of training, but had difficulties 
disengaging from Dimension A when it became irrelevant in Context 2. This difference in the 
contextual modulation of attention provides a ready explanation for our findings on predictive 
learning reported in the previous section: Good learners were able to acquire the correct 
predictive response in both contexts because they learned to focus on the relevant dimension 
in each context. Poor learners on the other hand exhibited a selective retardation of correct 
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predictive responding in Context 2 because they failed to disengage from Dimension A and 
thus focused on cues that were not predictive for the correct response in the second context. 
While encoding of the context was essential for predictive learning in the acquisition 
stage, it was arbitrary in the test stage. The discrimination of A3B3→R1, A4B4→R2 in 
Context 1 and A5B5→R1,  A6B6→R2 in Context 2 could have been acquired successfully 
without any encoding of the contexts and with a random bias for either Dimension A or B or 
both in any context. The second stage of our experiment thus provided a test for the 
hypothesis that the context-dependent attentional bias acquired during associative learning 
transferred to a learning situation where this bias was not necessary for correct responding. 
The results suggest that good learners exhibited a perfect transfer: In Context 1 they spent 
more time fixating on elements of Dimension A than Dimension B, while in Context 2 
fixation dwell times were longer for Dimension B than for Dimension A. In contrast, such an 
effect was absent for poor learners in the test stage. 
Besides the two cues (shape, letter) that were presented in each trial, the display also 
featured the two color stimuli as shown in Figure 1. One color was the context color that 
specified the relevant cues as either letter or shape, and the other color was a constant control 
stimulus. Figure 5 depicts the probability of fixating these colors (context vs. control) at least 
once per trial depending on the color of the context (1 vs. 2) for good learners (top) and poor 
learners (bottom) during training (left) and test (right). The first aspect to note in Figure 5 is 
the overall low fixation frequency. On average, participants moved their eyes to fixate the 
peripheral colored boxes on only about 46% of all trials in the training stage and 40% of all 
trials in the test stage.  
------------------------------------------ 
Figure 5 about here 
------------------------------------------ 
Because in the training stage encoding of the context color was essential for correct 
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responding, and good learners exhibited a high percentage of correct responses as shown in 
Figure 3, it seems as if the context could have been encoded without looking at it directly but 
rather identifying its color in the visual periphery. Furthermore, with the blocked context 
changes used in our experiment, participants were likely to realize, that after a context change, 
the context would be constant for the next series of trials. From this perspective, there just 
was no need to attend to the context on each and every trial. However, on top of this rather 
low general fixation frequency, Figure 5 depicts differences between experimental conditions. 
A super-ordinate ANOVA Group (Poor, Good) × Stage (Train, Test) × Color (Context, 
Control) × Context (1, 2) revealed a main effect of stage, F(1,24) = 6.560, p = .017, η2 = .022, 
and a main effect of color,  F(1,24) = 4.787, p = .038, η2 = .003, that was modulated by 
interactions Group × Color,  F(1,24) = 5.416, p = .028, η2 = .004, and Group × Color × 
Context,  F(1,24) = 4.272, p = .049, η2 = .001. To further examine this interaction, we 
conducted a planned comparison of cell means as also reported for fixation dwell time above. 
For the ordering of factor levels shown on the x-axes in Figure 5 the contrast weights λ = [1, -
1, 1, -1] coded for the joint hypothesis that (a) during training participants paid more attention 
to the context color than to the control color, and (b) this attention bias for the context 
transferred to the test stage. Collapsed across both stages, this contrast was highly significant 
in the group of good learners, t(24) =  3.193, p = .002, r = .545, where fixation probability for 
the context color exceeded fixation probability for the control color. In contrast, the same 
comparison of cell means was not significant in poor learners,  t(24) =  -0.099, p = .538, r = 
.020. Further analysis revealed that for good learners the contrast was significant for both, the 
training stage,  t(44) =  2.268, p = .028, r = .323, as well as the test stage,  t(44) =  2.835, p = 
.013, r = .391, suggesting that good learners paid more attention to the previously relevant 
learning context even if this bias was no longer necessary for solving the task in Stage 2. In 
comparison, for poor learners, the contrast was neither significant during training,  t(44) =  -
0.347, p = .634, r = .052, nor during test. t(44) =  0.189, p = .567, r = .029 (p-values adjusted 
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for multiple testing of four contrasts). 
In summary, the analysis of fixation frequency revealed that good learners exhibited an 
attentional bias for the context color over the control color that was not evident in poor 
learners. For good learners, the peripheral color that indicated which cue element (letter or 
shape) was a good predictor of the outcome attracted gaze with higher probability than the 
non-informative control color and this attentional bias transferred to the test stage. 
The results from Experiment 1 clearly support the conclusion drawn from the studies 
by Uengoer et al. (2013) and George and Kruschke (2012) that attention can come under the 
control of contextual stimuli. Participants who successfully mastered a conditional 
discrimination for which cues from Dimension A were relevant in Context 1, but irrelevant in 
Context 2, while cues from Dimension B were irrelevant in Context 1, but relevant in Context 
2, showed different patterns of overt attention across the contexts during training. More 
precisely, cues from Dimension A received more overt attention than those from Dimension B 
in Context 1, while the opposite pattern of overt attention was observed in Context 2. 
Furthermore, when subsequently presented with novel stimuli from both dimensions 
possessing equal predictive values, changes in overt attention were transferred to the novel 
stimuli in a context-specific manner. Thus, although all the novel cues were equally relevant, 
cues belonging to Dimension A received more overt attention than those from Dimension B 
when presented in Context 1, while the opposite was observed in Context 2. Moreover, there 
was no evidence that overt attention was modulated by contextual changes in those 
participants who failed to successfully solve the initially trained conditional discrimination. 
This finding confirms that the context-specificity of overt attention observed in the present 
experiment was related to learning experience and not to other aspects of the procedure.      
 
Experiment 2 
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In Experiment 1 and in the studies by Uengoer et al. (2013) and George and Kruschke 
(2012), context-dependent associability was induced by means of a conditional discrimination 
in which each cue was explicitly trained as both relevant and irrelevant depending on the 
context. The second aim of the present study was to investigate whether such explicit training 
in which the significance of a cue changes according to context is necessary for the formation 
of contextual control of associability. This question was addressed by Experiments 2 and 3. 
Both experiments used a procedure adopted by Uengoer et al. (2013). For each trial, 
participants were shown two cues from two dimensions (A, B; letter, shape), presented side 
by side, and the context was provided by a colored rectangular frame surrounding the cues. 
Table 2 illustrates the design for the two groups of Experiment 2. Initially, all participants 
received discrimination training across two contexts. In Context 1, outcomes were predictable 
on the basis of two cues from Dimension A (A1 and A2), while two cues from Dimension B 
(B1 and B2) were irrelevant. In Context 2, the discrimination involved another set of cues 
from either dimension (A3, A4, B3, B4) and was solvable on the basis of those belonging to 
Dimension B, while Dimension A was irrelevant. Hence, the significance of each cue 
remained unchanged throughout training and the discrimination was solvable on the basis of 
cues A1, A2, B3 and B4, while the remaining cues or the contexts were, in principle, not 
required for accurate performance.   
In Stage 2, participants were trained with an optional-shift discrimination involving 
novel cues from both dimensions (A5, B6). In the optional-shift discrimination, compound 
A5B5 was paired with Outcome O1, and compound A6B6 with O2. Half of the participants 
(Group C1) received the optional-shift discrimination in Context 1, while the other half 
(Group C2) was trained in Context 2.  
In order to assess the way in which participants solved the optional-shift 
discrimination from Stage 2, transfer compounds A5B6 and A6B5 were tested in Stage 3 
either in Context 1 (Group C1) or in Context 2 (Group C2).  
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If training of the discrimination in Stage 1 induces context-dependent changes in 
associability, participants in Group C1 will solve the optional-shift discrimination from Stage 
2 on the basis of Dimension A, whereas participants in Group C2 will rely on Dimension B 
during the second stage. As a consequence, Group C1 will show a higher proportion of 
Outcome 1-predictions in response to the transfer compound A5B6 than to the compound 
A6B5, while we should observe the opposite in Group C2 with a higher proportion of 
Outcome 1-predictions for A6B5 than A5B6. In contrast, if the Stage 1-discrimination is 
unable to establish context-dependent associability, then there should be no systematic 
learning bias in favor of one dimension during the subsequent stages in each group. 
Accordingly, a difference in responding between the two transfer compounds should be 
observed in neither group.  
In order to facilitate acquisition of the initial discrimination for our participants, we 
simplified our experimental procedure. First, recording of eye-gaze was abandoned, as this 
measure was not necessary to assess the predictions just described for the transfer stage. In 
this way, we avoided demands caused by task requirements related to gaze position recording. 
Second, we included a period of preliminary training in which participants were given the 
opportunity to acquire the Stage 1-discrimination step by step (for details, see Method 
section). 
------------------------------------------ 




Participants. A group of 64 students of Philipps-Universität Marburg (of which 45 
were females) participated in Experiment 2. Their ages varied between 18 and 35 years, with 
a median of 23. They either participated in order to meet course requirements or were paid for 
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their attendance. Participants were randomly allocated to the two groups as they arrived at the 
experimental room. They were tested individually and required approximately 15 min to 
complete the experiment. For six additional participants, the experiment was terminated 
during a preliminary training period because they failed to complete one of four phases of this 
preliminary treatment within 40 trials (see below). Furthermore, data of two additional 
participants were excluded from analyses because their predictions were incorrect on more 
than 30 % of the eight trials presented during the first or second half of the last block of Stage 
1 (see below). Participants gave informed written consent to participate in the experiment.  
Apparatus and procedure. Instructions and further necessary information were 
presented on a computer screen. Participants interacted with the computer using the mouse. 
Twelve different squares (with a side length of 4 cm each) were used as cues. Each of six of 
these squares displayed a white line drawing of one of six geometric shapes (circle, cross, 
parallelogram, pentagon, star, or triangle) on a black background. Each of the remaining 
squares showed one of six capital letters (G, K, M, P, S, or Y) in black font on a white 
background. A red and a blue rectangular frame served as Contexts 1 and 2. The frames were 
24 cm wide and 12 cm high. The two different outcomes were the numbers 1 (O1) and 2 (O2). 
For each group, the stimuli were counterbalanced as follows. Half of the participants received 
the red frame as Context 1 and the blue frame as Context 2, whereas for the other half, the 
blue frame served as Context 1 and the red frame as Context 2. For half of the participants in 
each of these two context conditions, Cues A1 to A6 represented the six geometric shapes and 
Cues B1 to B6 represented the six capital letters. For the other half, Cues A1 to A6 
represented the letters and Cues B1 to B6 represented the shapes. Both the assignment of 
specific shapes or letters to Cues A1 to A6 and the assignment of specific shapes or letters to 
Cues B1 to B6 were implemented randomly for each participant.      
Each participant was initially asked to read the following instructions (in German) on 
the screen: 
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“This study is concerned with the question of how people learn about relationships between 
different events. In the following experiment, you will be shown a succession of different 
figures. Each figure is composed of two symbols surrounded by a coloured frame. Moreover, 
each figure belongs to a specific category: Category 1 or Category 2. Your task is to find out 
which figures belong to Category 1 and which figures belong to Category 2. To solve this task, 
you will be shown different figures one after the other. For each figure, you should predict 
whether it belongs to Category 1 or Category 2. For this prediction, there will be two response 
buttons available. After you have made your prediction, you will be informed about the 
category membership of the figure. Use this feedback to discover which figures belong to 
Category 1 and which figures belong to Category 2.  
Obviously, at first you will have to guess, as you do not know anything about the criteria 
for categorization. But eventually you will find out according to which criteria the figures are 
assigned to the categories. On the basis of this knowledge, you should make correct predictions-
as many as possible. 
For all of your answers, accuracy rather than speed is essential. Please do not take any 
notes during the experiment. If you have any more questions please ask them now. If you don’t 
have any questions, please start the experiment by clicking on the Next button.”  
 
On each trial, two squares displaying one shape and one letter were shown on the top 
half of the screen. The two squares were presented side by side, with the left–right allocation 
of shape and letter determined randomly on each trial. Each square appeared at a distance of 4 
cm from the vertical centre of the display. Squares were surrounded by a rectangular frame in 
either red or blue. Participants were asked to predict the category membership of the stimulus 
configuration by clicking on one of two answer buttons labelled “1” or “2”. Immediately after 
they responded, another window appeared, telling participants the category membership of the 
stimulus configuration. Participants had to confirm that they had read the feedback by 
clicking on an “OK” button. Subsequently, the next trial started. 
During Stage 1, all participants received discrimination training in two different 
contexts. In Context 1, Cues A1 and A2 signaled category membership, while Cues B1 and 
B2 were irrelevant. In Context 2, the task was based on Cues B3 and B4, while Cues A3 and 
A4 were irrelevant. Stage 1 comprised 80 trials and was divided into five blocks each of 16 
trials. Within each block, the four trial types related to the same context were presented on 
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eight consecutive trials with each trial type presented twice in a random order. Whether a 
block started with trials in Context 1 or Context 2 was determined randomly for each block 
and each participant, except for the final block of Stage 1. In this case, the order of contexts 
was counterbalanced across participants.     
A period of preliminary training was given prior to Stage 1 in order to facilitate 
acquisition of the discriminations (e.g. Mitchell, Griffiths, Seetoo, & Lovibond, 2012; 
Uengoer et al., 2013). There were four phases of this preliminary treatment (Phase Ctx1/a: 
Context 1: A1O1, A2O2; Phase Ctx1/ab: Context 1: A1B1O1, A1B2O1, A2B1O2, 
A2B2O2; Phase Ctx2/b: Context 2: B3O1, B4O2; Phase Ctx2/ab: Context 2: 
A3B3O1, A3B4O2, A4B3O1, A4B4O2). Each preliminary phase comprised at least 
one block of eight trials. The number of additional blocks given to a participant depended on 
their prediction accuracy. Within each block of Phases Ctx1/a and Ctx2/b, each of the two 
trial types was presented four times in a random order; within each block of Phases Ctx1/ab 
and Ctx2/ab, each of the four trial types was presented twice in a random order. If participants 
accomplished one block of a phase without an incorrect prediction, the next phase was 
initiated. Otherwise, the phase was repeated for a further block. If participants failed to 
complete one phase within 40 trials (5 blocks), the experiment was terminated. Phase Ctx1/a 
was always followed by Phase Ctx1/ab and Phase Ctx2/b was always followed by Phase 
Ctx2/ab. Whether preliminary training commenced in Context 1 or in Context 2 was 
counterbalanced across participants in each group. Stage 1 started immediately after the 
completion of the four preliminary phases.  
After participants completed Stage 1, they immediately received a discrimination with 
A5B5O1 and A6B6O2 trials. Thus, outcomes during this stage were predictable on the 
basis of Cues A5 and A6 as well as on the basis of Cues B5 and B6. For half of the 
participants, this discrimination training was conducted in Context 1 (Group C1), whereas for 
the other half, training took place in Context 2 (Group C2). Stage 2 comprised five blocks 
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each of four trials. Within each block, each of the two trial types was presented twice in a 
random order. 
Following Stage 2, participants received a series of test trials with A5B5, A5B6, 
A6B5, and A6B6 either in Context 1 (Group C1) or in Context 2 (Group C2). This test was 
introduced by the following instructions: “Now the feedback telling you the correct category 
membership of a figure will be omitted. Nevertheless, please exert yourself to predict which 
figures belong to Category 1 and which figures belong to Category 2.” The setup of the test 
trials was identical to that of the previous trials, with the exception that the feedback window 
was omitted. The Test Stage comprised 24 trials and was divided into three blocks each of 
eight trials. Within each block, each of the four trial types was presented twice in a random 
order.      
 
Results and Discussion 
The left-hand panel of Figure 6 presents the mean proportions of correct predictions 
across the five blocks of Stage 1 separated by group and context. As can be seen, participants 
showed a high level of accuracy throughout Stage 1 indicating the effectiveness of the 
preliminary exercise phase. Most importantly, performance during Stage 1 did not differ 
across groups and contexts. 
 ------------------------------------------ 
Figure 6 about here 
------------------------------------------ 
This was confirmed by a 2  5  2 repeated measures ANOVA on the proportions of 
correct predictions, including the within-subjects factors context (1 vs. 2) and block (1–5), 
and the between-subjects factor group (C1 vs. C2). The analysis revealed no main effect of 
block, F(4, 248) = 1.59, p = .19, yielding no evidence that the level of accuracy changed in 
the course of Stage 1-training. The main effects of context and group and all interactions 
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including either or both of these factors were not significant, all Fs < 1.38, indicating that 
performance did not differ significantly across contexts and groups.  
The right-hand panel of Figure 6 shows the mean proportions of correct predictions 
across the five blocks of Stage 2 separated by group. A Block (1–5)  Group (C1 vs. C2) 
ANOVA on the proportions of correct predictions revealed a main effect of block, F(4, 248) = 
51.55, p < .001, η2 = .364, indicating that the accuracy of predictions increased across the 
blocks of Stage 2. Neither the main effect of group nor the Block  Group interaction was 
significant, both Fs < 1.84, showing that performance during Stage 2 did not significantly 
differ between Contexts 1 and 2.  
Figure 7 presents the performance of our participants during the Test Stage in which 
feedbacks about the outcomes were omitted. The data shown are the mean proportion of 
Outcome 1-predictions across the six presentations of each trial type separated by group.  
------------------------------------------ 
Figure 7 about here 
------------------------------------------ 
For the compounds that were already trained in Stage 2, A5B5 and A6B6, all 
participants responded during the Test Stage according to the contingencies that they had 
experienced in the previous phase. A Cue (A5B5 vs. A6B6)  Group (C1 vs. C2) ANOVA on 
the proportions of Outcome 1-predictions revealed a main effect of cue, F(1, 62) = 482.35, p 
< .001, η2 = .877,  showing a higher proportion of Outcome 1-predictions to A5B5 than to 
A6B6. The main effect of group and the Cue  Group interaction were not significant, both Fs 
< 1, indicating no evidence for a difference in discrimination performance across the groups.  
In case of the transfer compounds A5B6 and A6B5, the two groups showed opposite 
patterns of discrimination performance during the Test Stage. A Cue (A5B6 vs. A6B5)  
Group (C1 vs. C2) ANOVA on the proportions of Outcome 1-predictions revealed neither a 
main effect of cue nor a main effect of group, both Fs < 1, but a significant Cue  Group 
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interaction, F(1, 62) = 17.22, p < .001, η2 = .212, indicating that discrimination between the 
cues varied across groups. We found that participants in Group C1 predicted Outcome 1 with 
a higher proportion for A5B6 than for A6B5, t(31) = 2.59, p = .015, while participants in 
Group C2 showed the opposite pattern with a higher proportion of Outcome 1-predictions for 
A6B5 than for A5B6, t(31) = -3.35, p = .002. 
Overall, after having acquired a discrimination for which two cues from Dimension A 
were relevant in Context 1, and two other cues from the same dimension were irrelevant in 
Context 2, while two cues from Dimension B were irrelevant in Context 1, and two other cues 
from the dimension were relevant in Context 2, participants solved a second discrimination, 
for which novel cues from both dimensions were equally relevant, in different ways 
depending on the context. When the second discrimination was given in Context 1, 
participants more readily learned about the cues from Dimension A than Dimension B, while 
in Context 2, learning took place more readily about cues from Dimension B than A. This 
finding is consistent with the view that the initial training resulted in context-specific changes 
in associability: in Context 1, the associability of cues from Dimension A was greater than 
that of cues from Dimension B, whereas in Context 2, cues from Dimension B possessed 
greater associability than those from Dimension A. 
Our finding is inconsistent with a proposal put forward by Uengoer et al. (2013) that 
context-specific changes in associability may only emerge under conditions in which the 
significance of a cue changes according to context (see also, George & Kruschke, 2012). To 
our knowledge, Experiment 2 is the first to provide evidence that changes in associability 
during discrimination learning can come under the control of contextual stimuli in the absence 
of associative interference. In order to demonstrate the reliability of our finding, the purpose 
of Experiment 3 was to provide additional evidence for our conclusion by using another kind 
of test procedure.          
 




The design of Experiment 3 is shown in Table 3. Stage 1 of the experiment was 
identical to that of Experiment 2. Thus, two groups of participants were initially trained with a 
discrimination involving two contexts; two cues from Dimension A were relevant in Context 
1, while another pair of cues from this dimension was irrelevant in Context 2, and two cues 
belonging to Dimension B were irrelevant in Context 1, while another pair of cues from this 
dimension was relevant in Context 2. In Stage 2, participants received a discrimination 
composed of novel cues from either dimension for which Dimension A was relevant and 
Dimension B was irrelevant. For half of the participants (Group C1), the discrimination in 
Stage 2 was conducted in Context 1, whereas for the other half (Group C2), training in Stage 
2 took place in Context 2. If, as concluded from the previous experiment, the original training 
results in context-dependent changes in associability, then during Stage 2, the irrelevant 
Dimension B will initially possess greater associability than the relevant Dimension A in 
Group C2, which should impair acquisition of the discrimination compared to Group C1 in 
which the relevant dimension should have greater associability than the irrelevant dimension 
from the outset of Stage 2.           
------------------------------------------ 




 Participants. Another group of 64 students of Philipps-Universität Marburg (of 
which 39 were females) participated in Experiment 3. Their ages varied between 20 and 53 
years, with a median of 23. Participants either attended in order to meet course requirements 
or were paid with sweets. They were randomly allocated to the two groups as they arrived at 
the experimental room and were tested individually. Participants required approximately 15 
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min to complete the experiment. For four additional participants, the experiment was 
terminated during a preliminary training period because they failed to complete one of four 
phases of this preliminary treatment within 40 trials. Furthermore, data of one additional 
participant was excluded from analyses because the predictions were incorrect on more than 
30 % of the eight trials presented during the first or second half of the last block of Stage 1. 
All participants gave informed written consent to participate in the experiment. 
Apparatus and procedure. The instructions, stimuli, and procedure were identical to 
those aspects of Experiment 2, unless stated otherwise. Following Stage 1, all participants 
immediately received a discrimination based on Cues A5 and A6, while Cues B5 and B6 were 
irrelevant. For half of the participants, this discrimination training was conducted in Context 1 
(Group C1), whereas for the other half, training took place in Context 2 (Group C2). Stage 2 
comprised five blocks each of eight trials. Within each block, each of the four trial types was 
presented twice in a random order. 
   
Results and Discussion  
The left-hand panel of Figure 8 presents the mean proportions of correct predictions 
across the five blocks of Stage 1, separated by group and context. A Context (1 vs. 2)  Block 
(1–5)  Group (C1 vs. C2) ANOVA revealed a main effect of block, F(4, 248) = 4.70, p = 
003, η2 = .021. All other main effects or interactions were not significant, Fs < 1.72.  
------------------------------------------ 
Figure 8 about here 
------------------------------------------ 
The right-hand panel Figure 8 presents the mean proportions of correct predictions 
across the five blocks of Stage 2 for each group. A Block (1–5)  Group (C1 vs. C2) ANOVA 
revealed a main effect of block, F(4, 248) = 42.16, p < .001, η2 = .269, and a main effect of 
group, F(1, 62) = 4.07, p = .048, η2 = .029, reflecting that the accuracy of predictions was 
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higher in Group C1 than in Group C2. The Block  Group interaction was not significant, 
F(4, 248) = 1.28, p = .29.   
After a discrimination for which cues from Dimension A and Dimension B were 
trained as relevant and irrelevant, respectively, in Context 1, while other cues from Dimension 
A and Dimension B were irrelevant and relevant, respectively, in Context 2, a second 
discrimination, for which novel cues from Dimension A were relevant and novel cues from 
Dimension B were irrelevant, was acquired more rapidly when it was conducted in Context 1 
compared to training in Context 2. Consistent with the previous experiment, the results from 
Experiment 3 support the conclusion that changes in associability during discrimination 
learning can come under the control of context, even under conditions in which contextual 
information is not essential for successful acquisition.     
  
General Discussion 
In each of three experiments, we found evidence that attention can be modulated by 
context. In the initial phase of each experiment, participants received a discrimination for 
which cues from Dimension A were relevant in Context 1, but irrelevant in Context 2, while 
cues from Dimension B were irrelevant in Context 1, but relevant in Context 2. Experiment 1 
used the same set of cues in Contexts 1 and 2, while in Experiments 2 and 3, different cues 
were presented across the contexts. Following initial training, participants in each experiment 
were trained with a transfer discrimination involving novel cues from both dimensions. In 
Experiments 1 and 2, the transfer discrimination was optional as it was solvable on the basis 
of either Dimension A or B (or both), while for the transfer discrimination in Experiment 3, 
Dimension A was relevant and Dimension B was irrelevant. 
In Experiment 1, measures of eye-gaze showed that Dimension A received more overt 
attention than Dimension B when the transfer task was given in Context 1, while the opposite 
pattern of overt attention was found in Context 2. Results from the transfer discrimination in 
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Experiment 2 revealed that the discrimination was solved on the basis of Dimension A when 
trained in Context 1, but on the basis of Dimension B in Context 2. In Experiment 3, we 
observed that the transfer discrimination was acquired more rapidly when given in Context 1 
compared to Context 2. 
The finding that attention can be brought under contextual control had been 
documented in previous studies by Uengoer et al. (2013) and George and Kruschke (2012). 
The present experiments go beyond these previous studies in two important ways. First, by 
recording eye-gaze as a marker of attention, Experiment 1 provided converging evidence for 
context-specific attention, which is strong support for the validity of the conclusions drawn 
from the studies by Uengoer et al. and George and Kruschke. Second, Experiments 2 and 3 
demonstrated contextual control of stimulus associability despite the absence of associative 
interference on the level of individual cues.  
The results from Experiments 2 and 3 indicate that associative interference is not a 
necessary condition for the formation of context modulated attention, contrary to proposals 
put forward by Uengoer et al. (2013) and George and Kruschke (2012) in order to reconcile 
their findings with those reported by Griffiths and Le Pelley (2009), who found no evidence 
that associability is influenced by contextual changes. However, the present Experiments 2 
and 3 featured another source of interference – context-dependent alternations in the 
significance of entire stimulus dimensions. Such a source of interference was absent in the 
study by Griffiths and Le Pelley, which may be an important procedural difference that is 
responsible for the diverging results. For example, during training of the initial 
discriminations in Experiments 2 and 3, participants may have, at first, transferred changes in 
attention that were encouraged by training in one context to the different cues trained in the 
other context. Such transfer of attentional changes from one context to the other would be 
detrimental for accurate performance during the first experimental stage, which may have 
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encouraged the formation of contextual control of attention to overcome this source of 
interference.                 
The present study is challenging for many theories of learning and attention (e.g., 
Kruschke, 1992; Le Pelley, 2004; Mackintosh, 1975; Pearce et al., 1998; Pearce & 
Mackintosh, 2010). Our results are in keeping with the general principle adopted by these 
models that relevant cues receive more attention than irrelevant stimuli, and that these 
differences in attention influence the ease with which learning about the stimuli takes place. 
However, these theories characterize attention to a stimulus in a context-independent manner, 
and are, therefore, unable to deal with the present results indicating that attention can come 
under contextual control. In the following paragraphs, we present two of these theories in 
more detail - the theory of attention by Mackintosh (1975) and Kruschke’s (1992) ALCOVE.       
Mackintosh (1975) proposed that attention to a stimulus will increase if an outcome is 
predicted more accurately on the basis of this stimulus than on the basis of all other stimuli 
concurrently present, whereas attention to a stimulus will decrease if an outcome is predicted 
more accurately by other accompanying stimuli. Mackintosh assumed that changes in both 
associative strength and attention occur to individual cues. The model adopts an elemental 
view of stimulus representation in which specific combinations of stimuli are not encoded. 
Thus, successful acquisition of the conditional discrimination from Experiment 1 lies outside 
the scope of the model. Therefore, our first experiment may be considered as not appropriate 
for assessing the theory. However, acquisition of the initial discrimination from Experiments 
2 and 3 poses no challenge for Mackintosh’s theory as it is solvable on the basis of four 
individual cues (A1, A2, B3, B4). According to the model, training of the discrimination will 
result in considerable attention to the four relevant cues, whereas the remaining cues and the 
contexts will undergo decreases in attention, which makes it impossible for the model to 
account for the differences in learning during the transfer discrimination observed in each of 
the Experiments 2 and 3. 
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Kruschke’s (1992) ALCOVE can deal with each of the initial discriminations in the 
present study. This configural model assumes a stimulus representation that characterizes 
stimuli as points in a multidimensional psychological space. The input layer consists of nodes, 
each corresponding to a single psychological dimension, and is connected to a hidden layer of 
nodes representing training exemplars. Activation of hidden nodes depends on the similarity 
between the exemplar represented by a node and the external stimulus. The functional role of 
attention in this model is to increase or decrease the importance of individual dimensions for 
the calculation of the similarity between an exemplar and a stimulus. For each of the present 
experiments, ALCOVE predicts that training of the initial discrimination will result in 
Dimension A, Dimension B, and the contexts receiving the same amount of (high) attention. 
Thus, the model is also unable to anticipate the context-specific changes in attention indicated 
by the results from each of the present experiments.        
The assumption that attention to a stimulus may vary according to the context in which 
it appears was put forward by Sutherland and Mackintosh (1971) and a formal versions of this 
idea can be found, for instance, in Kruschke’s (2001) EXIT model. In the model, attention to 
a stimulus is mediated by exemplar nodes encoding specific stimulus configurations. Thus, in 
the model, it is possible that a stimulus receives different amounts of attention depending on 
other accompanying stimuli. However, in its current form, EXIT does not provide an entirely 
satisfying account for the present results. For the process of learning stimulus-outcome 
associations, the model adopts a purely elemental view of stimulus representation, which 
makes it impossible for the model to account for the acquisition of the conditional 
discrimination from Experiment 1. And, the model assumes that changes in attention occur on 
the level of individual cues. Changes in attention may generalize to other similar cues, but the 
rules governing generalization of attention are not specified. Therefore, it remains unclear 
whether the model is able to account for the results from the transfer stages of the present 
experiments.       
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The present study is consistent with the general assumption that more attention is paid 
to stimuli that reliably signal upcoming events than to unreliable signals. A different 
relationship between prediction value and attention was proposed by Pearce and Hall (1980). 
They suggested that stimuli that are followed by unexpected events receive more attention in 
order to facilitate further learning about these stimuli. The present results are not in 
accordance with this proposition, but, for other learning situations, it was found that changes 
in attention follow the principles advocated by Pearce and Hall (e.g., Hogarth, Dickinson, 
Austin, Brown, & Duka, 2008; Kaye & Pearce, 1984). Future research may investigate 
whether changes in attention according to Pearce and Hall can also come under the control of 
contextual stimuli.  
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Design of Experiment 1 
 
Stage Block Context Discrimination 
1 1, 3, 5 C1 A1B1→R1,  A1B2→R1 
A2B1→R2,  A2B2→R2 
 2, 4, 6 C2 A1B1→R1,  A1B2→R2 
A2B1→R1,  A2B2→R2 
2 7, 9 C1 A3B3→R1, A4B4→R2 
 8, 10 C2 A5B5→R1, A6B6→R2 
 
Note. Contexts C1 and C2 are squares in different colors. A and B refer to stimulus 
dimensions shapes and letters (counterbalanced) and related indices assign specific values of a 
dimension. R1 and R2 are different responses (single and double mouse click). Relevant cues 


















Design of Experiment 2 
 
Stage Context Group C1 Group C2 
1 C1 A1B1→O1,  A1B2→O1 
A2B1→O2,  A2B2→O2 
A1B1→O1,  A1B2→O1 
A2B1→O2,  A2B2→O2 
 C2 A3B3→O1,  A3B4→O2 
A4B3→O1,  A4B4→O2 
A3B3→O1,  A3B4→O2 
A4B3→O1,  A4B4→O2 
2 C1 A5B5→O1, A6B6→O2  
 C2  A5B5→O1, A6B6→O2 
3 C1 A5B5→?,  A5B6→? 
A6B5→?,  A6B6→? 
 
 C2  A5B5→?,  A5B6→? 
A6B5→?,  A6B6→? 
 
Note. Contexts C1 and C2 are rectangular frames in different colors. A and B refer to stimulus 
dimensions shapes and letters (counterbalanced) and related indices assign specific values of a 
dimension. O1 and O2 are different categories. “?” represents absence of feedback to 
















Design of Experiment 3 
 
Stage Context Group C1 Group C2 
1 C1 A1B1→O1,  A1B2→O1 
A2B1→O2,  A2B2→O2 
A1B1→O1,  A1B2→O1 
A2B1→O2,  A2B2→O2 
 C2 A3B3→O1,  A3B4→O2 
A4B3→O1,  A4B4→O2 
A3B3→O1,  A3B4→O2 
A4B3→O1,  A4B4→O2 
2 C1 A5B5O1,  A5B6O1 
A6B5O2,  A6B6O2  
 C2  A5B5O1,  A5B6O1 
A6B5O2,  A6B6O2 
 
Note. Contexts C1 and C2 are rectangular frames in different colors. A and B refer to stimulus 
dimensions shapes and letters (counterbalanced) and related indices assign specific values of a 









Figure 1. Sequence of events in a trial of Experiment 1. 
 
 






Figure 2. Bimodal distribution of the individual levels of correct responding in the acquisition 
phase of Experiment 1. Learners were classified as “poor” versus ”good” based on a cutoff 
value of 75%. Note that a score higher than 75% means that good learners responded above 
chance level (50%) in both learning contexts of the acquisition phase, whereas a score smaller 
or equal to 75% could have been caused by the acquisition of correct responding in one 
context only.  
  
 





Figure 3. Probability of a correct response dependent on post-hoc factor group (Good 
Learners, Poor Learners), stage (Training, Test) and context (1, 2) in Experiment 1. In the 
training stage poor learners specifically failed to acquire correct responses in the second 
context. Error bars denote standard error of the means. 
 






Figure 4. Fixation dwell time on cue dimensions in Experiment 1. Error bars denote standard 










Figure 5. Probability of fixating the colored context and control stimulus during the 4-sec 
interval of presentation in Experiment 1. Error bars denote standard error of the means. 
 






Figure 6. Mean proportions of correct predictions across the five blocks of Stage 1 (left 











Figure 7. Mean proportions of Outcome 1-predictions across the four trial types presented 
during Stage 3 of Experiment 2, collapsed across the six presentations of each trial type 











Figure 8. Mean proportions of correct predictions across the five blocks of Stage 1 (left 
panel) and the five blocks of Stage 2 (right panel) of Experiment 3 separated by groups and 
contexts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
